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Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes from RoomSquaresGhulam-Rasool ChaudhryHossein GhodosiJennifer SeberryDepartment of Computer ScienceCentre for Computer Security ResearchUniversity of WollongongWollongong, NSW 2500, AUSTRALIAchaudhry/hossein/j.seberry@uow.edu.auTo Anne Penfold Street on her retirementAbstractSecret sharing schemes are one of the most important primitivesin distributed systems. In perfect secret sharing schemes, collabo-ration between unauthorised participants cannot reduce their uncer-tainty about the secret.This paper presents a perfect secret sharing scheme arising fromcritical sets of Room squares.1 IntroductionA secret sharing scheme is a method of sharing a secret S among a niteset of participants P = fP1; : : : ; Png in such a way that if the participantsin A  P are qualied to know the secret, then by pooling together theirpartial information, they can reconstruct the secret S; but any set B  P,which is not qualied to know S, cannot reconstruct the secret. The keyS is chosen by a special participant D, called the dealer, and it is usuallyassumed that D =2 P. The dealer gives partial information, called the share,to each participant to share the secret S.1
An access structure   is the family of all the subsets of participants thatare able to reconstruct the secret. The sets of P belonging to the accessstructure   are called authorised sets and those not belonging to the accessstructure are termed as unauthorised sets.A secret sharing scheme is perfect if an unauthorised subset of partici-pants B  P pool their shares, then they can determine nothing more thanany outsider about the value of the secret S.An authorised set A is minimal if A0  A and A0 2   implies thatA0 = A. We only consider monotone access structures in which A 2  and A  A0 implies A0 2  . For such access structures, the collection ofminimal authorised sets uniquely determines the access structure. In therest of this paper we use   to denote the representation of access structurein terms of minimal authorised sets.Secret sharing schemes were rst introduced by Blakley [1], Shamir [8]and Chaum [2] in 1979, and subsequently have been studied by numerousother authors (see, for example, [9]). A number of mathematical structureshave been used to model shared secret schemes. Some of these are polyno-mials, geometric congurations, block designs, Reed-Solomon codes, vectorspaces, matroids, near-right elds, complete multipartite graphs, orthogo-nal arrays, Latin squares and Room squares. Cooper, Donovan and Seberry[5] proposed a secret sharing scheme arising from Latin squares. Chaudhryand Seberry [4] developed secret sharing schemes based on critical sets ofRoom squares. Both of these schemes are not perfect. In this paper, wepropose a perfect secret sharing scheme arising from critical sets of Roomsquares. Though we propose secret sharing scheme based on Room squares,however, the method can easily be generalised over Latin squares as well.2 Room SquaresA Room square R of order r is an r r array each of whose cells may eitherbe empty or contain an unordered pair of objects 0; 1; 2; :::; r, subject to thefollowing conditions:(i) each of the objects 0; 1; 2; :::; r occurs precisely once in each row of Rand precisely once in each column of R,(ii) every possible unordered pair of objects occurs precisely once in thewhole array.Mullin and Wallis [7] proved that, there exists a Room square of everyodd integer side r , r  7.A critical set Q = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qcg, in a Room square R of order r, is aset of quadruples Qi = (x; y; k; `), 1  i  c, such that if any Qi is removed2
0,1 { 4,5 6,7 { { 2,35,7 0,2 { { { 1,3 4,6{ 5,6 0,3 1,2 { 4,7 {{ 3,7 { 0,4 2,6 { 1,53,6 1,4 2,7 { 0,5 { {2,4 { { 3,5 1,7 0,6 {{ { 1,6 { 3,4 2,5 0,7** ** ** ** ** ** **** ** ** ** ** ** 4,6** ** ** 1,2 ** ** **** 3,7 ** ** ** ** **** 1,4 2,7 ** ** ** **** ** ** 3,5 ** 0,6 **** ** ** ** 3,4 2,5 0,7Table 1: A Room square of order 7 and one of its critical setsfrom the set, the Room square can no longer be uniquely completed. Ineach Qi, the pair (x; y) denotes the position (i.e., row x and column y) ofthe pair (k; `) in the Room square. That is,Q provides minimal informationfrom which R can be reconstructed uniquely.Table 1 illustrates a Room square of order 7 and one of its criticalsets of size 10, where \" denotes the unknown entries and \{" denotesthe empty positions in the square. The critical set in this table consistsof following quadruples: f(2,7;4,6), (3,4;1,2), (4,2;3,7), (5,2;1,4), (5,3;2,7),(6,4;3,5), (6,6;0,6), (7,5;3,4), (7,6;2,5), (7,7;0,7)g.It should be noted that there is not much known about critical sets ofRoom squares. The number of critical sets in a Room square of order r arestill unknown, but they grow exponentially for higher order Room squares(see Chaudhry and Seberry [3]).3 Related WorkChaudhry and Seberry [4] proposed a secret sharing scheme based on criticalsets of Room squares. In their scheme, the shares of participants are thequadruples of a critical set taken from the Room square. When a groupof participants, whose shares constitute a critical set, pool their sharestogether, they can reconstruct the Room square which is the key. But,every unauthorised set does not constitute the critical set, and thus, cannot3
reconstruct the secret. For example, in order to distribute the shares (thequadruples of the critical set given in Table 1) among an authorised set Ai =fPi1; Pi2; Pi3g, the dealer may assign three quadruples (2,7;4,6), (3,4;1,2)and (4,2;3,7) to Pi1, three quadruples (5,2;1,4), (5,3;2,7) and (6,4;3,5) to Pi2and remaining four quadruples (6,6;0,6), (7,5;3,4), (7,6;2,5) and (7,7;0,7) toPi3 (or any other possible combinations to distribute ten shares amongthree participants). A similar scheme was also proposed by Cooper et al [5]arising from Latin squares. The drawbacks of the above construction are:1. The schemes are not perfect. Since each share is a component of acritical set, it determines the exact information of a component fromthe Room square and therefore, the uncertainty of a participant aboutthe secret is not equal to the uncertainty of an outsider.2. The scheme does not work if the number of participants in an au-thorised set is greater than the order of the critical set (since eachparticipant must be assigned at least one quadruple).Now we propose a perfect secret sharing scheme that is applicable overarbitrary access structures (no matter what is the size of its authorisedsets). Though we propose secret sharing scheme based on Room squares,however, it can easily be generalised over Latin squares as well.4 The SchemeLet P = fP1; : : : ; Png be the set of all participants in the system and let  = fA1; : : : ;Atg be an access structure with t authorised sets over P. Letthe critical set Q = fQ1; : : : ; Qcg of a Room square R of order r be thesecret1. For every authorised set Aj, 1  j  t, of size nj , the dealer usesthe Karnin-Greene-Hellman [6] algorithm to distribute the shares to theparticipants.Set-up Phase:1. For every participant Pju, 1  u  nj   1, the dealer, D, selects(independently at random) c quadruples (xjv; yjv; kjv; `jv), 1  v  c,>from all possible values over (Zr+1,Zr+1,Zr+1,Zr+1).2. The dealer computes the share for the last participant Pjnj , corre-sponding to each Qi = (xi; yi; ki; `i), 1  i  c, using(xjni ; yjni ; kjni; `jni) = (xi; yi; ki; `i)   ni 1Xv=1 (xjv; yjv; kjv; `jv)! (1)1In fact, the secret is the Room square R. However, from information point of view,the information contents of a Room square is the same as the information contents ofits critical set. 4
where computation is done overZr+1.3. D distributes, in private, the shares to the corresponding participants.Clearly, if participants of an authorised set pool their shares (by addingtheir corresponding shares over Zr+1) they can construct the critical set.Thus, the reconstruction phase could be as follows.Secret Reconstruction Phase:1. Participants of every authorised set Ai can pool their shares, that is,summation of all shares over Zr+1 gives a critical set which is thesecret.Example: Take a Room square of order 7 given in Table 1. Let thecritical set Q = f(2,7;4,6), (3,4;1,2), (4,2;3,7), (5,2;1,4), (5,3;2,7), (6,4;3,5),(6,6;0,6), (7,5;3,4), (7,6;2,5), (7,7;0,7)g be the secret, S.Suppose there are three participants P11, P12 and P13 in the authorisedset A1. Let the participants P11 and P12 be given the shares s11 and s12(selected randomly) such that:s11 = f(4,5;2,3), (3,4;5,5), (1,6;0,3), (2,3;1,5), (7,1;4,7), (4,4;0,7), (2,4;1,2),(6,7;2,6), (0,0;3,5), (6,1;4,7) g,s12 = f(3,3;2,3), (4,7;1,0), (1,4;2,5), (5,7;6,7), (5,7;2,4), (3,7;3,4), (2,6;5,6),(7,3;4,6), (7,5;0,4), (4,4;0,1) g,The share s13 associated with participant P13 can be computed as follows(using equation (1) for every quadruple respectively),s13 = S   (s11 + s12)= f(3,7;0,0), (4,1;3,5), (2,0;1,7), (6,0;2,0), (1,3;4,4), (7,1;0,2), (2,4;0,6),(2,3;5,0), (0,1;7,4), (5,2;4,7) g.In secret reconstruction phase, when these three participants collabo-rate, (i.e., add their shares modulo 8) they can compute the critical set Q,which is the secret.4.1 Security of the SchemeIn this section we prove that the proposed secret sharing scheme is perfect.That is, the uncertainty of a set of unauthorised collaborating participants(about the secret) is equal to the uncertainty of an outsider who knowsnothing about the secret.Let P = fP1; : : : ; Png and let   = fA1; : : : ;Atg be an access structureover P. Let the critical set Q = fQ1; : : : ; Qcg of a Room square R of orderr be the secret. Further, let a secret sharing scheme as mentioned earlierrealises this access structure.Observe that the nj participants of every authorised set Aj can recoverthe secret using equation (1). Now we have to show that any set B  Aj5
containing nj   1 participants cannot recover the secret. Clearly, the rstnj   1 participants cannot do so, since they receive independent randomtuples as their shares. Consider the nj 1 participants in the set B possessthe shares sj1 ; : : : ; sji 1 ; sji+1 ; : : : ; sjnj and the missing participant's shareis sji such that, sji = S   njXu=1u6=i sju (mod r + 1):By summing their shares, they can compute S   sji . However, they do notknow the random tuples of the share sji and hence they have no informationas to the real value of S. That is, the scheme is perfect.AcknowledgmentsWe thank A/Prof. Josef Pieprzyk for helpful conversations. The secondauthor would like to thank the University of Tehran for 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